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li. liNTRODUCTION 
J.L. Austin expresses the common understanding of the distinction 
between justifications and excuses, respectively ,  when he says: "In the one 
defense . . .  we accept responsibility but deny that it was bad: in the other, we 
admit that it was bad but don ' t  accept full , or even any, responsibility ."J This 
way of dividing up the terrain leaves out a possibility : we accept responsibility 
for the deed, admit that it was bad, but argue that our behavior was 
understandable  under the circumstances and that we should therefore not be 
punished. This Article will argue that the criminal law ' s  defense of duress per 
minas belongs in this third category, and that the category marks out a species 
of excuse. Duress is most often , how·ever, understood in terms of one or the 
other of the surrounding categories, thus being thought to be either a 
justification or a denial of the voluntariness of the agent's conduct. 
· ·  Visiting Scholar, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D. candidate, 
Uni';�rsity of Pittsburgh Philosophy Department. The author wishes to thank Kurt Baier, Peter 
Detre, George Fletcher, David Gauthier, .Jeffrie Murphy, Kate Stith, and Michael Thompson for 
their helpful comments on vi'.rious drafts and for illuminating discussions on the topic of this 
Anicle. 
l . .hYII\! L ;".u:::;·ni'l, A ?l.o:nfor Excuses, in Pl-l!LOSOPHlCAL PAPERS 175, 176 (3d eel. 
l 9 ?S' .. > 
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The idea that justification and lack of voluntariness exhaust the 
philosophical basis for legal defenses is the product of a mistaken idea about 
responsibility: the assumption that an individual is fully morally responsible for 
the bad things she does, provided that she does them intentionally .2 Against the 
background of this assumption, the two standard approaches to duress fall out 
naturally as the only two possible grounds for withholding blame in such cases. 
Blame can only be withheld from an actor for something she did intentionally 
when the thing done causes more good than harm. If the thing done turns out to 
be unintentional, either because it was the consequence of an action that was not 
itself intentional, or because it was an unintended consequence of an intentional 
action, the question of moral responsibility, in the typical duress case, does not 
arise. Against the background of the above idea about responsibility, then, there 
are two theories of defense potentially available to defendants in such situations: 
justification and excuse, where excuse is taken to mean lack of responsibility. 
This Article will argue that the foregoing conception of responsibility is 
confused, and it will attempt to show that a third conception of duress becomes 
available on an alternative theory of responsibility. 
The conception of duress for which the Article will argue is that actions 
performed under duress flow from states of character we endorse, such as 
loyalty and prudence. While traditional commentary maintains that character is 
irrelevant to the criminal law,3 this Article will argue that the modern bias 
against character makes a mystery of why we should ever exonerate agents for 
harm they bring about intentionally when the infliction of harm does not raise 
the aggregate level of social welfare. Although this Article will focus entirely 
on the duress defense, other defenses of the criminal law may share the 
conceptual structure of duress and thus should lend themselves to similar 
analysis.4 For a defense of this sort, there is a gap between the legal use of the 
defense and the theoretical rationales commentators are able to offer for it. The 
Article attempts to bridge this gap for the duress defense by holding fixed the 
current use of the defense and attempting to develop a rationale for it which is 
consistent with this use. Existing rationales would all require significant reform 
of the law in order to close the gap between theory and practice. 
Before continuing, it is important to articulate an assumption which 
underlies the present discussion. It is a premise of this Article that a single legal 
doctrine, especially one in the criminal arena, should be justified in tern1s of a 
single philosophical rationale. Some may object to this assumption, claiming 
that certain elements of the defense can be explained under one rationale, while 
others seem to lend themselves to explanation under another. But there is a 
natural conceptual unity to doctrines in the criminal law, presumably because 
the criminal iaw tends to echo moral theory, and there is a conceptual unity to 
the various elements of common sense morality. In addition, the single rationale 
assumption is justified by the difficulty that would otherwise exist of resolving 
2 .  The Anicle will assume the view of intentional action most familiar to philosophers, 
that articulated by Donald Davidson. See generaily DONALD DAVIDSON, Actions, Reasons and 
Causes,  in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 3 (!980); DONALD DAVIDSON, Agenc .. v, 
in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS. suora, at -'U. 
3. See FlY MAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRllviiNAL JUSTICE 321-28 ( 1979); Samuel H. 
Pillsbury, The M'co..ning of Deserved P:mishment: An Essay on Choice, Character and 
Responsibiii:y, 67 lND. L.J. 719, 727 (t992). 
i� See in.fra text accon1_panying notes 109-112. 
.., 
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cases at the margins:  it i s  possible to determine whether duress should be 
allowed as a defense to murder, for example, only if we can articulate why we 
allow a duress defense generally. It i s  the premise of this Article, then, that the 
demand for a unified treatment of a legal defense is not an excessive one to 
make of legal theory. 
The next Part presents and explains the most commonly accepted 
elements of the duress defense. Parts III and IV then turn to two prevalent 
rationales for the defense, referring  to them as the "welfarist" and the 
"voluntarist" conceptions respectively .  These Parts attempt to motivate the 
search for an alternative conception by showing that neither rationale can form 
the basis for a complete theory of duress, since both fail to account for its core 
elements .  Part V indicates the intellectual territory an alternative to the 
standard theories should occupy . It considers, among other things,  Sections 34 
and 35 of the German Criminal Code, which, it argues, point in the direction of 
a sensible alternative to the approaches presently available in Anglo-American 
law. Part VI attempts to flesh out the suggested approach to duress by focusing 
on the role of dispositions in ethical assessment. It draws support from 
Aristotle's discussion of ethical judgment, and in particular, from his distinction 
between j udgment of action and j udgment of character .  I t  also explores 
Aristotle's own discussion of duress, and it argues for an interpretation of his 
brief treatment of the subj ect. The proposed theory of duress thus provides a 
way of understanding a passage in  Aristotle that commentators have often found 
obscure. The Conclusion elaborates the Article' s diagnosis of why the two 
standard rationales for duress have long seemed to legal scholars to exhaust the 
possible store of explanations for the defense in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
II. THE ELEMENTS OF THE DURESS DEFENSE 
The duress defense has prevailed in the following sorts of cases. An 
individual robs a liquor store because an aggressor credibly threatens to shoot 
him and to harm his family if he does not.S A man smuggles drugs from 
Colombia to the United States by swallowing cocaine balloons after he is 
threatened with his own death and the death of his family . 6  A trave ler 
participates in a robbery, which turns murderous, upon orders of the principal 
assailant and threats by the same to his life.? A person drives a getaway car for 
the I .R .A.  upon threats to his life by a notorious terrorists A taxicab driver, 
threatened by a passenger armed with a gun, drives the passenger to a bank the 
latter intends to rob.9 
It is important to distinguish between the possible rationales for duress 
and the legal requirements that are generally taken to constitute the defense.1o 
5 .  State v. Tanner, 3 01 S .E . 2d 1 6 0  (W. Va.  198 2 )  (defendant found guilty nonetheless 
because duress defense disbelieved). 
6 .  United States v.  Contento-Pachon, 7 23 F.2d 69 1 (9th Cir. 1 984) . 
7 .  State v .  Hunter, 74 0 P. 2d 5 5 9  (Kan.  1 9 87)  (duress is defense to felony-murder 
where defendant not principal). 
8 .  Lynch v.  Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1 All E.R. 913 (H.L .  1975 ) (duress held 
acceptable excuse to second degree murder). 
9 .  People v.  Merhige, 18 0 N.W. 418 (Mich. 1920) .  
1 0 .  Sometimes courts or commentators wi l l  attempt to  offer one o f  the elements o f  the 
defense as a rationale, such as the fact that the defendant hac! no reasonable opportunity to escape 
from the situation, or that the threat was of death or serious bodi l y  injury. See infra text 
accompanying notes 11-17. But it should be clear that when we speak of the theoretical ground 
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As will become clear in the next two Parts, there i s  little consensus on the 
former, while the case law, legislation and commentary are fairly consistent in 
their acceptance of the latter. Substantive debate focuses mostly on the more 
marginal requirements. 
The core requirements for claiming the defense are generally  accepted as 
the following: 
(1) The defendant must have no reasonable opportunity to escape from 
the coercive situation. l l  
(2) The defendant must be threatened with significant harm-death or 
serious bodily injury .l2 
(3) The threatened harm must be illegal.J3 
(4) The threat must be of imminent harm. l 4 
(5) The defendant must not have placed herself voluntarily i n  a situation 
in which she could expect to be subject to coercion, as is the case when a 
person joins a violent criminal organization.  IS 
The two requirements which appear to have marginal status are as 
follows :  
( 6) Duress must not be pleaded as  a defense to  murder. l 6 
(7) The defendant must have been acting on a specific command from the 
coercer.17 
Let us briefly review each requirement in turn. 
The first requirement, that the defendant have no reasonable opportunity 
to escape, bears on whether the defendant was in fact confronted with the stark 
of a legal doctrine, we are looking for something on a different level  altogether. 
1 1 . See, e.g., Pancoast v. Commonwealth, 3 4 0  S . E .2d 833 (Va. App .  1986) (doctor 
who failed to take advantage of reasonabl e  opportunity to escape barred from claiming she wrote 
false prescriptions under duress) .  
1 2 . See United States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 1982); State v.  Scott, 827 
P.2d 733 ,  7 39-4 0 (Kan. 1992); Peopl e  v. Luther, 232 N.W.2d 1 84, 187 ( M i c h .  1 97 5 ) .  
Although this condition i s  general ly  adhered to in  the cases, debate about i t  appears in  the 
commentary. See, e. g. , WAYNE R .  LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.  SCOTT, JR. ,  CRIMINAL LAW 438 
(2d. ed.  1 986) ("Ii is  not proper, on principle, to l imit the defense of duress to s i tuations where 
the instrument of coercion is a threat of death or serious bodily injury .  A threat to do bodily  harm 
less  than serious bodily harm, or a threat to destroy property or reputation, ought to do . . .  "); see 
also 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 1 77 (c)(2) ( 1 984) (arguing that the 
relevant consideration is "the nature of the actor 's  state of coercion and his abi l ity to resist  it"). 
13. See Regina v. Hurley, 1967 V . R. 526, 543.  
1 4 .  See, e.g., Shapiro, 669 F.2d at 596; Scott, 827 P.2d 739. 
1 5 . Scott (defendant who j oined drug-sel l ing organization voluntaril y  barred from 
claiming duress when coerced into torturing fellow member). 
1 6 . This condition is debated in the commentary, see 2 ROBINSON, s up ra note 1 2, 
§ 177(g)( l ), but the prohibition seems to hold firm in the case law, see State v. H unter, 74 0 P.2d 
559 (Kan. 1987); State v. Strickland, 29 8 S.E.2d 645 (N.C.  1983) ;  Cawthon v. State, 382 
So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 198 0); State v .  Little, 312 S. E .2d 695, 697 (N. C .  Ct. App. 
1984). Courts have sometimes allowed the defense to a charge of accomplice murder, see Lynch 
v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1 All E.R. 913 (H.L.  1 975)  (accepting defendant's plea of 
duress to charge of aiding and abetting murder of police officer), or to felony-murder, see 
Hunter (accepting plea to charge of felony-murder where defendant claimed he was not 
triggerman). 
1 7. S22 lViartin R. Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape from 
Prison-A Step Tmvards Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV .  11 0, 
128-130 (i975). ' 
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choice between suffering the threatened harm and performing the illegal act. If 
another course of conduct was open to the defendant, such as reporting the 
threat to the authorities, the defendant is obligated to pursue that option. While 
this requirement bears some relation to the imminence requ irement, 1 8 it is 
conceptually separate from it, since it is possible for threatened harm to be 
imminent yet for the defendant to have a way of avoiding the illegal act other 
than suffering the harm. 
The requirement that the threat be of significant harm actually 
incorporates two separate requirements : the condition that the defendant have 
received an actual threat, and the condition that the threatened harm be of 
sufficient gravity. First, requiring  an actual threat rules out coercion by 
unusually attractive offers , such as the offer of a high-paying job to an indigent 
if he carries out some i l legal act.l9 It also rules out threats that are merely 
inherent in a situation, such as a menacing dog or the risk of an avalanche.2o 
Threatening conditions are believed to be more appropriately raised under the 
category of necessity.21 Nevertheless, an actual threat has been found to exist 
when the threat was only implied by the coercer' s  general behavior.22 It need 
not be an articulated threat. Second, courts are fairly consistent in requiring 
that the threatened harm be of death or grievous bodily injury .23 Although the 
definition of "grievous bodily inj ury" is vague, it appears to mean roughly 
inj ury that is life-threatening or which "seriously interfere[s]  with [the victim's ]  
health and comfort. "24 The requirement is generally taken to  exclude non­
physical harm, such as loss of reputation or psychological distress.2s 
The requirement that the threatened act be illegal rules out use of the 
defense when , for example, the coercer is acting under a claim of right. But  
this requirement hardly requires articulation, since threats to  perform legal acts 
will not result in illegal conduct.26 A person who threatens another with injury 
will not be able to claim his actions are justified if he demands the performance 
of an illegal act. As discussed below,27 if one allows that the defense can be 
claimed for responses to threats that are not themselves commanded by the 
coercer, it becomes possible for a person to commit an unlawful act in response 
to a lawful threat. Thus a defendant could trespass on private property to escape 
from a threat of bodily injury when the threat was issued in defense of a third 
party. Duress should presumably not be available as a defense to trespass in 
such a case.28 
1 8 .  See infra text accompanying notes 29-3 1 .  
1 9 . See Joshua Dress ler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the ExntSe and 
Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 33 1 ,  1 336  (1989) ("Duress implicates 
threats, not offers."). 
2 0 .  !d. at 1 339 .  
2 1 .  As  discussed below, distinguishing defenses according to the source of the threat is  
ad hoc and should probably be abandoned. See infra text accompanying note 48. 
2 2. See People v. Pena, 197  Cal .  Rptr. 264, 272 (Cal .  App.  Dep't Super. Ct. 1 983) ;  
Regina v .  Valderrama-Vega, 1 985 Crim. App .  220. 
2 3 .  See supra note 1 2. 
2 4 .  Wellar v. People, 3 0  Mich. 1 6,20 ( 1 874); Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 74 A.2d 1 25 ,  
1 30 ( Pa. l950).  
25. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1 2, at 436. 
2 6 .  See Dressler, supra note 19, at 1 339-40. 
2 7 .  See infra text accompanying notes 35-36.  
2 8 .  See generally Herbert Fingarette, Victimization: A Legalist Analysis of Coercion, 
Deception, UndLte Influence, and Excusable Prison Escape, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 65, 79 
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The imminence requirement ,  while strongl y  suppo rted by the 
j urisprudence of duress,29 is in fact a proxy for several other, distinct concerns. 
One might see it as an attempt to ensure that the defendant committed the illegal 
act because of the threat received. The defense would be open to abuse, for 
example, if a defendant were able to claim she performed an i l legal act because 
of a threat that something terrible would befall her in several years. S uch a 
threat might be too diffuse to make the defendant actually believe she was under 
serious pressure to comply .3o The requirement is thus generally understood as 
ensuring that the threat is "operating upon the mind of the defendant at the time 
of the alleged act. "31 In addition, the imminence requirement bolsters the "no 
escape" requirement. The longer the period of time between the threat and the 
threatened harm, the greater the chances that the defendant can find a way out 
of the situation. 
The requirement that the defendant not have placed himself  intentionally 
in a situation in which he knew he would be subject to coercion is  on somewhat 
shakier ground than the other core requirements, since there is little case law 
on the question. It appears, however, to be generally accepted in codifications 
and commentary.32 The Model Penal Code ("MPC") disallows the defense in 
such a case, and even goes so far as to bar the defense when the defendant was 
reckless or negligent in entering a situation in which he could expect to be 
coerced, when recklessness or negligence respectively are sufficient mens rea 
for the offense . 3 3  The general point of the requirement is clear: individuals 
should be excused from bad acts only when they are in fact blameless with 
respect to those acts. A person who intentionally enters a coercive situation is 
not free from blame when he performs a criminal act under threat. In addition, 
the requirement serves an obvious deterrence function, since it may dissuade 
individuals from j oining organizations they foresee will pressure them to 
commit illegal acts. 
As we shall see, the requirement that duress not be pleaded as a defense 
to murder makes little sense under either of the prevalent rationales for the 
defense. Nevertheless, most courts have accepted the restriction.34 Further 
discussion of this requirement will await the explanation of the rationales in the 
next two Parts. 
Finally, requiring that the act be commanded by the coercer should make 
the defense inapplicable where the defendant undertakes a method of avoiding 
the threatened harm on his own initiative. The typical case is one in which the 
defendant escapes from prison following threats of death, imminent bodily 
harm, or sexual abuse and the prison guards are unreliable as a source of 
succor . 35 But the jurisdictions that do allm.v a defense in this situation are 
n.42 (1985). 
2 9. See Dressler, supra. note 19, at 1340 & n .46 (describing the imminence requirement 
as "entrenched in American legal history"). 
3 0 .  The imminence requirement should probably be taken to apply to two different time 
periods if it is to satisfy these concerns:  the period in between the moment of the threat and the 
time of the defendant' s  illegal act. and the period in between the moment of the threat and the 
time when the threat was to have been carried out. 
3 l. People v. Luther, 232 N.V/.2d 184, 187 (Mich. 1975). 
32.  See C'.essler, supra nme 19, at  134!. 
3 3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (1980) 
3 4. See suora note 16. 
3 5. Wher� courts have allowed the defense in such cases, the defer.dant must turn 
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divided over whether the correct defense is duress or necessity .36 
As the above discussion demonstrates, there has been a fairly consistent 
approach to actual cases involving the duress defense, and commentators 
generally agree that the core elements of the defense should be retained. Despite 
the clarity of application, however, there is little consensus on the reason for 
allowing a defense with these requirements . Courts ignore the question, and 
commentators either do the same or offer confused rationalizations. This has 
made principled debate about the more marginal cases difficult, and has left the 
basis for exoneration in cases in which the defense is accepted mysterious. The 
next two Parts will explore the two most prevalent rationales for the defense in 
the legal commentary. The theories discussed form opposite philosophical 
approaches to the problem of duress .  As these Parts will show,  both approaches 
fail to capture many of the core elements of the defense. 
Ill. THE WELFARIST CONCEPTION 
The utilitarian approach to duress rationalizes the defense on the grounds 
that violating the law in the typical case of duress raises the level of social 
welfare . The Article will accordingly refer to this view as the "welfarist" 
conception. The welfarist conception regards the duress defense as a 
justification : it denies that acts performed under duress are bad acts . This 
approach echoes the doctrine of necessity, according to which an agent can 
claim he was justified in breaking the law if the criminal act was a lesser evil 
than would have occurred had the defendant not acted. Thus,  the actor who sets 
fire to a field to prevent the destruction of a town can claim the destruction of 
property is justified because it was the lesser evil. 
The clearest proponents of the welfarist conception are Wayne LaFave 
and Austin Scott: 
The rationale of the defense of duress is that, for reasons of social policy, 
it is better that the defendant, faced with a choice of evils, choose to do 
the lesser evil (violate the criminal law) in order to avoid the greater evil 
threatened by the other person. 37 
Glanville Williams also appears to favor this approach. He says that the reason 
for allowing a claim of duress is "precisely the same as that for allowing the 
defense of necessity , and in this respect duress can be regarded as a type of 
necessity . "38 And Jeremy Bentham says that in the case of something done "in 
the way of precaution against instant calamity," the actor shouid not be 
punished where, "although a mischief was produced by that act, yet the same act 
was necessary to the production of a benefit vvhich was of greater value than the 
mischief ."39 In addition, the criminal codes of four states explicitly treat duress 
himself over to the authorities upon reaching a position of safety. United States v. Bailey, 444 
U.S. 394 (1980); see also Gardner, supra note 17 . 
36. Compare People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr . 110 (Ct. App. 1974) (allowing the 
defense of necessity against prosecution for prison escape when defendant threatened with 
imminent homosexual attack) with People v. Hannon, 220 N.W.2d 212 (Mich. App. 1974) 
(accepting duress as a defense to prison escape). 
3 7. LAFAVE & SCOTT, suora note i2, at 433. 
3 8 .  GLANViLLE WiLL!A�lS, CRIMiNAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 755-56 (2d ed. 
1961 ). 
39. See JEREMY BENTHAt'vl, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATiON at 
XIII .V.2. But Bentham also seems to think that at least some cases of coercion are more l ike 
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as a justification.4o 
There are two ways one might interpret the emphasis on social welfare . 
First, one might suppose that a defendant can plead the defense only when his 
individual act increases the level of social welfare, where the baseline is the 
h arm that would have occurred without the defendant ' s i ntervention .  
Alternatively ,  one  might allow the defense insofar a s  the rule a llowing the 
defense would enhance social welfare, where the baseline is the level of social 
welfare in a world without such a defense. The first approach would consider 
the welfare effects of submission to coercion act-by-act. The second would 
consider the welfare effects of a legal rule permitting the defense.41 The next 
two Sections will consider each version of the welfarist rationale respectively . 
A. The Act-Utilitarian Version 
While proponents of the welfarist position do not explicitly endorse act­
utilitarianism, talk of lesser evils appears to focus on the social welfare effects 
of the individual act of submission to the threat. These discussions devote little 
or no attention to the secondary effects of allowing the defense. This emphasis 
is unfortunate, since the act-by-act approach is the less plausible of the two 
possible welfarist justifications for the defense.  Let us consider  how the 
approach fares in application to the elements of the defense set out above.42 
The act-utilitarian approach can arguably explain the first requirement, 
namely the condition that the defendant have had no reasonable opportunity to 
escape from the coercive situation, on evidentiary grounds. The availability of a 
legal means of escape implies that submitting to the threat i s  unl ikely to 
maximize utility .  If the requirement serves an evidentiary purpose, however, it 
ought merely to create a rebuttable presumption:  a defendant ought in theory to 
be able to prove that it would be utility-maximizing for him to submit to the 
threat, despite the existence of a legal means of escape, if escape would be more 
costly than submission to the threat. One might nevertheless j ustify the "no 
escape" provision on act-utilitarian grounds by noting that epistemic problems 
are likely to make rebutting a presumption of disutility in this case infeasible. 
Most of the remaining requirements are even less readily explained on an 
act-uti l i tarian view. The requirement that the threat be of death or serious 
bodily injury is highly arbitrary from an act-util itarian standpoint, since an 
agent threatened with minor bodily injury or loss of property maximizes utility 
by giving in to the threat when the coercer demands that she bring about any 
lesser harm. A defendant threatened with a broken finger should have a valid 
defense against a parking violation, on this view. No matter how insignificant 
the threat, it is always possible for performance of the illegal act to consti tute a 
involuntary, than voluntary action. !d. at XIII.XI.S. 
40. ARIZ . REV. STAT. ANN. § 13 -412 (1978); IOWA CODE ANN . § 704.10 (West 
1979); LA . REV. STAT. ANN . § 14.18(6) (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 
103-A (West 1983 ). 
4 1 .  There is another "rule-utilitarian" interpretation one might adopt. One can ask 
whether acts of submission to coercive threats are generally utility-maximizing. This approach 
would not consider the secondary welfare effects of incorporating the defense into a legal rule, 
but rather would limit its consideration to the welfare effects of a certain class of acts. The Article 
focuses on the more general rule-utilitarian approach, since it is more relevant to assessing the 
desirability of legal rules. 
4 2. See s!lpra text accompanying notes 11-17. 
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lesser evi l .  The restriction, moreover, does not normally apply to  the necessity 
defense.43 It is not surprising, then, that LaFave and Scott, as well as Williams, 
reject the requirement as applied to duress.44 But, as discussed below in the 
context of the voluntarist approach, there may be good reasons for the 
restriction which the welfarist conception cannot represent.45 
The imminence requirement is equally inexplicable on a welfarist 
rationale. If the salient consideration is maximizing social utility, why should it 
matter whether the threatened harm is imminent, as long as i t  is sufficiently 
certain to happen as to make calculations of social utility reliable? Perhaps one 
will respond that imminence is a proxy for high l ikelihood of occurrence. But 
if so, i t  is far from a reliable one, and courts could simply evaluate the 
likelihood of occurrence, or at least the apparent likelihood of occurrence, 
directly .  
The requirement that the defendant not have placed herself in a situation 
in which she could expect to be subject to coercion is also inexplicable on the 
act-utilitarian view. If performing the il legal act would be welfare maximizing 
under the circumstances, an act-utilitarian cannot support disal l owing the 
defense. As we shall see, rule-based forms of utilitarianism may not have this 
difficulty , since the defense can be justified in terms of the apparent incentive 
effects that a rule allowing the defense under these circumstances would create. 
But act-utilitarianism cannot consider general incentive effects : it is limited to 
an ex post evaluation of the welfare effects of a single act. 
The unavailability of the defense to murder appears at first to fare better 
than the other requirements under an act-utilitarian approach. If l ives are of 
equal worth, then social welfare is not enhanced when one person blls  another 
to save himself. But upon further consideration, act-utili tari anism may have 
difficulty accounting for this condition as wel l .  An act-uti litarian ought to 
endorse the defense to a charge of murder if the defendant is coerced into 
killing one person for the sake of saving a greater number. IVIurder under these 
circumstances creates a net benefit, again, assuming lives are of equal worth. 
More troubling sti l l ,  however, a careful utilitarian should probably reject the 
premise that l ives are of equal worth . The existence of a rich philanthropist 
may confer more social uti li ty than the existence of an unemployed, unskilled 
welfare recipient. If consistently applied, the lesser evils approach should tie the 
availability of the defense in cases of murder to an evaluation of the relative 
worth of victim and defendant. And this ,  one might be justified in saying, 
constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the lesser evi ls  approach. 
There are other, more general problems with the welfarist conception. 
First, it has difficulty explaining why necessity and duress remain separate 
defenses in most of Anglo-American law: the penal codes of the vast majority 
of American jurisdictions, as well as the MPC, distinguish them in separate 
43 . See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, at 445 . 
4 4. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, at 43 8 (arguing that threat of less than serious 
bodi ly harm or threat to destroy property should be sufficient if act done to avoid threat is 
relatively minor); WILLIAMS, supra note 3 8, at 756-57; see also sources cited supra note 12 and 
accompanying text. 
4 5 .  See infra Part IV. 
2 6 0  ARIZONA LAW REVIE'W [VoL 37:25 1  
p r o v i s i o n s ,  4 6  a s  does British l aw.47 B u t  since duress and necessity are 
redundant, on the welfarist conception, one would expect the two defenses to be 
combined under a general lesser evils defense. The welfarist conception thus 
has some explaining to do if i t  is to present itself as an accurate descriptive 
account of the duress defense. It can,  alternatively, be presented as a normative 
theory, one which seeks to abolish duress as a separate defense. B u t  on this 
strategy, the welfarist conception i s  not so much an account of duress as an 
argument against the possibility of such an account. The problem is  that the 
concept of coercion is absorbed into the more general principle of maximizing 
social welfare, and thus coercion disappears as an independent ground of 
exculpation. 
This is no doubt the reason why the welfarist conception often turns to a 
distinction based on the source of the threat: duress results from man-made 
threats, and necessity pertains to threats from natural forces.48 A person caught 
in a mountain storm struggling for survival can claim necessity in breaking into 
a mountain cabin she discovers. An actor threatened by another human being 
with death if she does not rob the bank would still be justified, on the welfarist 
account, but her defense is duress. The problem with this solution, however, is 
that the distinction seems ad hoc . Surely i t  i s  irrelevant from a normative 
perspective whether the source of the threat i s  man or nature. And if  i t  i s  not 
normatively relevant, and if duress and necessity are alike in every respect save 
this, then the distinction between duress and necessity cannot be a relevant one 
ei ther. But if the distinction is irrelevant, why should the law retain two 
separate defenses? 
Second, it may be difficult for the welfarist conception to handle cases of 
mistake about the availability of a j ustification. There are two sorts of mistake 
that can occur: the defendant can think his behavior is justified when it is not, 
and he can think his behavior is not j ustified when it i s .  The welfaris t  
conception, at least on the act-utili tarian interpretation,  impl ies  that the 
defendant should not be able to claim the defense in the former case but be 
allowed the defense in the latter. 
If the basis for the defense is that the action does more good than harm, 
on a welfarist conception, the defense should be unavailable if  the action in fact 
does more harm than good, even if the defendant reasonably believes it does 
more good than harm. The implication is that the welfarist conception must 
hold defendants strictly liable for their judgments about the availabil i ty of the 
defense. This would contradict the general approach to mistakes about the 
availability of a justification, since the law usually allows such actors to claim 
the benefit of the j ustification nonetheless.49 Moreover, welfarists themselves 
4 6 .  M ODEL P ENAL CODE §§ 2.09, 3 .02;  see Paul H. Robinson,  Crim inal Law 
Defenses, 82 COLUM . L. REV. 199 , 235 n. 1 3 5  ( 1 98 1 ) .  
4 7 .  See WILLIAMS, supra note 3 8 ,  § §  23 1 ,  242. 
4 8 .  See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 12, at 441. 
4 9 .  !d. at 436; see also Allison & Coleman v. City of B inningham, 5 8 0  So .  2d 1377,  
i 3 8 0  (/•.Ia. 199 1 )  ("Most cases  do not require that an actual peri l  exis t ;  a wel l -founded and 
reasonable belief is sufficient. Therefore, if  an actor i s  actually mistaken i n  his  belief, he may 
st i l i  use the defense.") ;  Nelson v. State , 597 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1979) ;  City of Chicago v.  M ayer, 
308 l'·� .E.2d 601 ( I l l . 1 974). But see State v. Jacobs, 371 So.2d 801 (La. 1979) (holding that 
actual necessity i s  requi red for a reasonable agent to claim defense of necessity) .  LaFave and 
S cott criticize this  latter decision. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1 2, at 446 n . 3 8 .  They also 
claim, however, that the defendant ' s  view of the gravity of the evils does not govern: "It  is for 
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appear to agree with this approach. LaFave and Scott, for example, say that the 
danger the defendant fears "need not be real ," and that it i s  sufficient if the 
defendant "reasonably believes it to be real . "So They cite a case for this 
proposition, however, in which the court offered largely a subj ective or  
psychological rationale for the defense.S I As discussed in Part IV,  i t  i s  natural 
for a subj ective approach to ignore whether the threat is real . But  the position 
cannot be adequately explained on an act-utilitarian rationale for the defense. s2 
Of course this does not require the welfarist to maintain that reasonable 
mistakes will not exonerate. He can claim that even if an actor mistaken as to 
the availability of a justification is not in fact justified, he i s  excused under the 
doctrine of mistake.53 On this approach, one would treat an actor mistaken 
about the availability of a necessity defense as excused rather than justified. But 
a view that treats duress as a j ustification cannot easily adopt this  same 
structure, since the approach would entail some quite arbitrary distinctions. 
Compare the standard duress case in which a person i s  ordered at gun point to 
rob a bank with an identical case in which the gun is later discovered to have no 
bullets. The latter situation never was life-threatening, although the defendant ' s  
belief that h i s  life was being threatened was  reasonable. I t  seems arbitrary to 
say that the defendant threatened with a loaded gun has a justification but to say 
that the defendant threatened with the empty gun has a mere excuse. Our 
intuitions about the cases are identical, and the legal doctrines of exoneration 
ought to be as well. 
Now consider the second sort of mistake case, that in which the defendant 
unknowingly creates more good than harm. If the act-utilitarian approach is  
strictly construed, the defendant ought to  be able to  claim the benefit of  her 
luck,  s ince she has performed an action which enhanced, rather than 
diminished, the level of social welfare. This i s  problematic, however, since 
defenses are normally available to defendants on the basis of their  ex ante 
calculations . The person unaware of circumstances that could j ustify her 
behavior is as culpable as if those circumstances did no: exist. This is  at least in 
part because she would presumably be willing to repeat the act without the 
benefit of j ustification in the future. It is part of the notion of j ustification that 
it requires knowledge of the circumstances constituting the j us ti fication .54 A 
the court, not the defendant, to weigh the relative harmfulness of the two alternatives." !d. at 
446-47. In other words, it is not the actor' s  value svstem that detennines which o f  two evil s  is  
the lesser. The assessment of the relative gravity of the evils must be obj ective. Tne case law 
appears to support thi s  position. See United States v.  Moylan, 417 F.2d 1 002, 1 008 (4th Cir. 
1 969) C'[T]he exercise of a moral judgment based upon individual standards does not carry with 
it  l egal justification . . .  "); State v.  Fee, 489 A.2d 606 (N.H.  1 9 85) (court rej ects defendant' s  
judgment a s  to which option is  lesser o f  two evi ls) .  
S 0 .  LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1 2, at 436. 
5 1 .  People v.  Luther, 232  N.W.2d 1 84 (Mich. 1 975) . 
52 . We return to this question in the discussion of the rule-utili tarian version of the 
welfarist position below. See infra Section B. 
53 . There is some support for this approach in the case law. See People v .  Scott, 1 94 
Cal . Rptr. 633 (Ct. App. 1 983)  (finding defendant who had ingested hallucinogens excused for 
car theft on grounds that he reasonably believed action was necessary to save life of himself and 
the president). 
5 4 .  LaFave and Scott appear to agree. at least in the case of necessity. They say that 
actual necessi ty, without knowledge and i n tention to act on the necess i t8us circumstances, i s  
never enough to exonerate an age ut. L A FAVE & SCOTT,  s up ra  note 1 2, at 446 . It  seems, 
however, that one need not be aware that the circumstances constitute a legal j ustification; one 
need only be aware of the circumstances themse! ves and perform the c.r: t in question because of 
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j ustification is a type of  motivating reason, and one cannot have such a reason 
of which one is unaware .ss This u nderscores the inadequacy of w elfarist 
theories of duress :  if the basis for the defense is enhancement of social welfare, 
the mentali stic,  or reason-related nature of the defense remains unexplained.56 
B. The Rule-Utilitarian Version 
One might attempt to render the welfarist conception more plausible by 
turning from act to rule-utilitarianism. The latter would attempt to j ustify 
duress in terms of the utility of having a legal rule permitting defendants to 
plead duress. Rule-utilitarianism allows a certain leeway : an act performed 
under duress would not i tself have to be welfare-enhancing to be permissible. 
The act would merely have to fall under a rule permitting the defense, and the 
rule would be justified by social welfare considerations. 
The philosophical, as opposed to the legal, literature on duress appears to 
favor this approach. A number of philosophers, for example, have argued that 
the defense is justified by the simple fact that a rule forbidding such acts could 
not be welfare enhancing because i t  would not be obeyed. Jeremy B entham 
thought it would be impossible to punish an act performed out of mortal fear 
sufficiently to induce an actor to refrain from performing the act: "the eveil 
which he sets himself about to undergo, in the case of his not engaging in the 
act, i s  so great, that the eveil denounced by the penal clause, in the c ase of his 
engaging in it, cannot appear greater ."57 Thomas Hobbes also adopted a 
deterrence rationale, saying that in a case in which a person i s  compelled to 
break the law by terror of present death, a person would reason thus :  "If I doe 
it  not, I die presently;  if I doe it ,  I die afterwards; therefore by doing it ,  there 
is time of life gained. "58 Strangely enough, even the most avid anti-utilitarian, 
these circumstances. 
5 5 .  A motivating reason is what philosophers sometimes call an "internal reason," i .e . ,  a 
reason for acting which the agent takes himsel f  to have and one which irnpels him toward action. 
An "external reason" is generally thought to be a consideration which points in  favor of an action 
by which the agent is not motivated. On some versions, a reason which is potentially motivating, 
given an agent' s psychological constitution, counts as an internal reason even if it is not actually 
motivating. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, Internal and External Reasons, in �.I!ORAL LUCK 1 0 1  
( 1 981) .  
5 6 .  One might wish to  object that the approach to  this sort of  case is not  consistent with 
other features of moralily.  Permitting defendants to take advantage of their luck is not, after all, 
u nfamil iar in  ethics, see id. at 20, nor i s  i t  foreign to the law. If two defendants aim at a human 
being and they both shoot, and if  one hits and the other misses, the former can be charged with 
murder, while the latter cannot be. Yet the latter is not a better person, from a moral point of 
view. He just got lucky. Analogously, one might argue that the agent whose evil  behavior saves 
a greater evil from occurring should benefit from his luck. Yet the intuition in this case is entirely 
different. 
The difference might be explained by the fact that the unaware defendant is attempting to 
offer his "luck" as a defense to an imputation of culpability that arises from harm the agent has 
actually caused. In the case of the lucky gunman, however, the ham1 that would make his  
behavior culpable in  the first place has not  occurred. Tnus in the  latter situation, the elements of 
the prima facie case do not exist, and the question of culpability (at least culpability for mmder) 
does not arise .  The defendant who is unaware of c ircumstances justifying h i s  act has 
successfully carried out a criminal act ,  and he has done the act intentionally. The question of 
culpability thus cannot be avoided. The individual who fires and misses, however, can usually 
be convicted for an attempt, but that is another matter altogether. 
5 7 .  B ENTHAM, supra note 3 9 ,  at XIII .Xl .5 .  
5 8 .  THOMAS H O B B E S ,  LEV I A T H A N  ch .  27 (R ichard Tuck ed. , 1 99 1 )  (emphasis 
omitted). 
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Immanuel Kant, defended the duress defense on deterrence grounds ,  
characterizing necessity as  a situation in which "no punishment threatened by 
the law could be greater than losing [one' s] life ."59 
The foregoing approaches,  however, are confused.  First ,  the 
philosophers incorrectly limit their analyses to threats of death. But there i s  no 
theoretical justification for ruling out use of the defense in situations in which 
the threat involves harm of a lesser degree. As discussed above,6o the duress 
defense is applicable to lesser threats. Second, pain and torture can always be 
added to death to make the punishment worse from the standpoint of expected 
utility than the death one would suffer at the hands of one' s coercer. There are, 
of course, other arguments against increasing penalties in  this  way ,  but 
B entham does not address them. Third, focusing on deterrence as the 
philosophers do is problematic because the difficulty of deterring such crimes 
can cut the other way: one can argue that the penalties for acts performed under 
duress should be more, rather than less, severe, since such acts are more 
difficult to deter.6 t  Assuming we wish to deter coerced acts, we will simply 
have to penalize them more harshly than we otherwise would. Of course the 
argument does not hold if these acts are literally impossible to deter. But the 
availability of ever more stringent penalties makes this assumption unreliable.62 
In addition, a deterrence analysis of the defense is not conclusive. In 
theory , nothing prevents the il legalization of a course of  action which is 
impossible to deter. Granted, for a utilitarian such as Bentham, deterrence is 
the only justification for punishment, and thus disallowing the defense is 
unj ustified if it is impossible to deter coerced behavior. But one would not 
expect a non-utilitarian to adopt this position, since for him there are other 
potential justifications for disallowing the defense. On a retributivist rationale 
for punishment, for example, the agent' s  culpability implies that he deserves to 
suffer in proportion to the suffering he has inflicted. Punishment for an offense 
must be inflicted, then, even if there is no hope of deterring the offender. 
If acts performed under duress are not impossible to deter, there is no 
quick and easy rule-utilitarian analysis of whether a duress defense is justified 
on social welfare grounds. We can approach the question by returning to the 
various elements of the defense and asking whether each one is justified in rule­
utilitarian terms. 
There are two requirements which fare better under a rule-uti litarian 
than an act-utilitarian interpretation. First, that the defendant have had no 
reasonable opportunity to escape need not lead merely to a rebuttable 
presumption, as on the act-utilitarian interpretation. This follows directly from 
the fact that a rule can be justified on social util ity grounds even if utility 
calculations occasionally weigh against allowing the defense. Second, the 
requirement that the defendant not have placed herself voluntarily in a situation 
in which she could expect to be coerced also fares better on a rule-uti litarian 
approach.  Thi s is because the requirement addresses i tself to an act of the 
5 9 .  IMMANUEL KANT, Appendix to the Introduction to the Elements of Justice, in THE 
M ETAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 4 1  ( 1 965) .  
6 0 .  See sources cited supra note 1 2  and accompanying text. 
6 1 .  The argument is Anthony Kenny's .  Anthony Kenny, Duress Per Minas as a Defence 
to Crime: II, 1 LAW & PHIL. 1 97,  203 ( 1 982).  
6 2 .  Cf RICHARD A.  POSNER, ECONOMIC A NALYSIS OF LAW 229-30 (4th ed.  1 992)  
(describing efforts to  institute strictly increasing schedule of penalties in medieval England). 
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defendant ' s  which occurs pri or t o  t h e  moment o f  coercion. Even i f  i t  w ou l d  
increase social uti l i ty for a defendant t o  succumb t o  coercion i n  a given instance 
in  which the coercion could have been foreseen ex ante, a rule  disallowing the 
defense in such s i tuations is  arguably effi cient :  i t  may deter individuals from 
entering into criminal organizations. This is not a result  we could have reached 
on an act-utilitarian interpretation.  
For the most part, however, a rule-utilitarian j ustification for the defense 
wil l  share the defects of i ts act-uti litarian counterpart. For example,  l ike act­
u ti l itarianism, rule-utilitarianism has difficulty j ustifying the requ irement that 
the threatened harm be of death or serious bodil y  inj ury. If, as w e  s aw ,  the 
requ i rement fai ls  as an act-utili tarian account because there are potential ly 
m any s ituations i n  which social ut i li ty would be enhanced by allowing the 
defense for lesser threats,  then a rule which disallows the defense for lesser 
threats will not be utility enhancing either. Simi larly,  i f  i t  would i ncrease social 
uti l i ty to allow the defense in situations in which the threatened h arm is  not  
imminent, then a rule requ iring i mminence could not  be socially efficient. Nor 
does the rule-utilitarian version of welfarism help to distinguish duress from 
necessity. We will still be left w ith having to accept a single, lesser evils defense 
to cover the two defenses.  Again ,  whether this is obj ectionable on i ts  o w n  
merits depends o n  whether one thinks the defenses should b e  kept separate. B ut 
the welfarist, who appears committed to regarding duress and necessity as 
separate defenses, will have to regard this as a strike against his account. 
The rule-utilitarian may fare some�ihat better i n  the debate about the 
avail ability of the defense to murder, but the result  is  inconclusive .  He can 
respond to rhe charge that a uti l i tarian basis for the defense requires an absurd 
evaluation of the worth of l ives by sayi ng rhat the epistemic d i fficulties 
associ ated with attempting to determine the worth of a human l i fe are 
insurmountable. Even if  the worth of a human life could be assessed, there is no 
reason to suppose that this assessment will  be avai lable to victims of coercion, 
'Nho must make quick decisions with relatively little information. Social uti l i ty 
i s  thus perhaps best served by treating human lives as equal in worth. B u t  i f  a 
defendant knnv the respective worth of the l ives involved, there would be no 
epistemic benefit to the assumption that l ives are of equal worth.  In this  case, a 
\Velfare-maximizing rule would have to require that the availabi l ity of the 
defense turn on the worth of the l ives involved. For thi s  reason,  we cannot 
s traight-forwardly conclude that the welfari s t  approach e ndorses  the 
unavailability of the defense to murder. 
Finally , consider the applicability of rule-utilitarianism to the two forms 
of mistake discussed above.  The rule-utilitarian can argue that a rule which 
allows reasonably mistaken actors to claim the benefit of a justification would 
be efficient.  S ince epistemic l imitations make difficult  a determination of 
w hether a justi fication properly applies to  a given situation ,  people w i l l  be 
discouraged from relying o n  their own judgment about the availability of a 
j ustification i f  they are held strictly l iable for their mistakes.  Th is argument, 
however, seems weak. Strict l iabil i ty about the avai labil i ty of the defense is 
unlikely to have much of a chilling effect on behavior. Someone acting u nder 
duress bas rnore important considerations to Vieigh than the remote possibi lity 
that her perception of the situation will prove crronem;s .  Given the importance 
of the issues at stake, and, at least in  the case of duress ,  the personal interests at 
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stake, the residual possibility of error i s  likely to seem of pale significance in 
the actor' s deliberations about what to do. 
The turn to rule-utilitarianism also does not appear to improve the 
answer that the welfarist can give to the second sort of mistake case, the actor 
unaware of justifying circumstances. For if a defendant is allowed to take 
advantage of his luck and claim the defense where what he has done is socially 
beneficial, regardless of whether he acted in order to raise the level of social 
welfare, he will, by definition, be permitted the defense only i n  cases in  which 
he actually does some good. There cannot be any harm, then, in a rule that 
allows for exculpation under these conditions, since an actor will never be able 
to claim the defense in a situation in which his behavior is socially detrimental. 
But perhaps the argument is that defendants will start to gamble, giving 
in to threats where, at least given what they know at the time, they should not. 
So, the argument might run, defendants will be encouraged to take foolish 
risks, hoping that they will get lucky and that their behavior will turn out to be 
justified. This is surely a weak argument, however, since the chances that one 
will be able to avail oneself of a j ustification that one does not now believe 
oneself to have are presumably too low to create an incentive for defendants to 
perform illegal acts they would not otherwise perform. 
A welfarist approach to duress, then, fails to provide a j ustification for 
the defense as it presently exists in the law, since most of the elements of the 
defense make little sense if welfare-maximization is our only concern. This is 
true whether the units over which we attempt to maximize utility are individual 
acts or rules governing acts of a certain type. Duress is simply not a defense 
that can be captured by welfarist thinking. 
V. THE VOLUNTARIST CONCEPTION 
B oth the academic literature on duress and the statutory codifications of 
the defense contain expressions of an entirely different rationale, one that is 
subjective or psychological : an individual who performs an action out of fear 
for his life may lack the ability to conform his behavior to the law. Paul 
Robinson, for example, says that " [t]he excusing condition in duress i s  the 
impairment of the actor' s ability to control his conduct."63 Proponents of the 
voluntarist conception regard the basis for exoneration as a loss of control 
resulting from an impaired psychological state. The typical formulation thus 
treats the defense as negating voluntariness. A British case, for example, says 
that duress is a defense when "the will of the accused has been overborne by 
threats of death or serious personal injury so that the commission of the alleged 
offense was no longer the voluntary act of the accused."6-+ George Fletcher says 
that " [e]xcuses apply on behalf of morally involuntary responses to danger; they 
acknowledge that when individuals merely react rather than choose to do 
wrong, they cannot fairly be held accountable."65 And the court in People v. 
Luther explained the grounds for duress as the fact that "compulsion or duress 
overcomes the defendant ' s  free will and his actions lack the required mens 
6 3 .  ROBINSON, supra note 12, at 35 1 .  
6 4 .  Regina v. Hudson, 2 All E.R. 244, 246 (C. A .  197 1 ) . 
6 5 .  GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 8 1 1  ( 1 978 )  (emphasis added). 
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rea ."66 
On this view, duress is an excuse rather than a j ustific ation .  If an 
individual follows a certain course of conduct because he literally cannot bring 
himself to do otherwise, his exoneration does not depend on his having done the 
right thing. An actor overwhelmed by fear cannot be expected to deliberate 
about his options, and consequently he cannot be blamed if he acts badly .  The 
relative gravity of the harms is irrelevant, on this view, s ince duress i s  
understood as  a claim that one was unable to  deliberate about relative harms 
and benefits. It is true that a defendant who accedes to the demands of a coercer 
may bring about less harm than he would by resisting these demands,  since i n  
the typical case h e  i s  threatened with death and ordered t o  perform some 
criminal act that does not involve death. But the fact that the defendant brings 
about the lesser evil in some cases is an accidental benefit of the situation, from 
a moral point of view. An individual overcome with fear acts because he is  
overcome, and not  because he sees that the act he is inclined to perform to save 
himself would minimize the evil in the world.67 
A. The Pure Voluntarist Position 
This Section will argue that, although the voluntarist conception has 
greater in tu i tive  appeal than the welfaris t  conceptio n ,  it too faces  
insurmountable obstacles to providing a complete explanation of  the defense. In  
particular, the voluntarist conception has difficulty explaining most of the core 
requirements. It must also reject the two marginal requirements, although this 
will appear to be a benefit if one seeks a basis for their rejection. 
The imminence requirement can be explained as an evidentiary condition 
on the voluntari st account. The more time the coercer leaves between the 
moment of the threat and the projected moment for carrying out the threat, the 
higher the likelihood that the defendant will be in control of his actions when he 
performs the illegal act. The requirement that the threat be of death or serious 
bodily injury might be analyzed as an evidentiary condition as well : true loss of 
control is not a likely result of threats of property damage. The stakes must be 
extraordinarily high, and the actor must feel herself powerless to evade the 
stark alternatives with which she is confronted before her claims of loss of 
control will be credible. Arguably, threats of non-physical harm or of minor 
bodily injury do not rise to this level . 
It speaks against the evidentiary explanation of these requirements ,  
however, that they are irrebuttable .  If  the requirements were evidentiary in  
nature, the law would allow one to prove that one was overwhelmed in other 
6 6. Peopl e  v. Luther, 232 N.W.2d 1 84 ,  1 87 (Mich.  1 975) .  The court in thi s  c ase  
outlined four requirements for the defense: 
A) The threatening conduct was sufficient to create in the mind of a 
reasonable person the fear of death or serious bodily harm; 
B )  The conduct i n  fact caused such fear of death or serious bodily harm i n  the 
mind of the defendant; 
C) The fear o r  duress was operating upon the mind o f  the defendant at the 
time of the alleged act; and 
D) The defendant �ommitted the act to avoid the threatened harm. 
!d. This fo1111ulation of the defense, however, contains a reasonable person standard. The test is 
thus not rigorously subjective. 
6 7 .  The last two conditions of the Luther test together ensure that the act was committed 
because of the fear of death or serious bodily inj ury . See id. 
_., . . ,, ..... 
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sorts of circumstances.  That is ,  on a thorough-going voluntarist conception, the 
defense should be available for an idiosyncratic defendant with a particularly 
low terror threshold. One might argue that rebuttable presumptions would be 
impossible to administer with respect to these requirements. What would count 
as sufficient evidence that a defendant had a particular sensitivity to the loss of a 
certain material possession, for example? But even if rebuttable presumptions 
are infeasible, it  may not be desirable to tailor the use of the duress defense to 
individu al peculiarities .  Someone who robs a bank because he is  out of his mind 
with fear over the threatened loss of his new sports car should probably not be 
able to claim the defense, no matter how great his attachment to his car. 
These two requirements are thus perhaps better understood in  normative 
terms, that is, as standards for loss of control that weaker defendants are 
expected to meet. They communicate that an agent who does lose the exercise of  
her deliberative faculties for less does not have values that the law will protect. 
The law need not accommodate exaggerated responses to threats of remote 
harm or perverse attachments to material possessions. 
The first and fifth requirements also seem more plausibly construed i n  
normative terms.  That the defendant had n o  reasonable opportunity t o  escape 
from the coercive situation admits of a possible evidentiary interpretation: it is 
perhaps implausible to think that the defendant would be out of control with 
fear if  the defendant could simply have walked away from the situation. The 
requirement is  more sensibly construed as bearing on the reasonableness of a 
defendant' s behavior in perfo rming the i llegal act. Whether the defendant 
voluntarily placed herself in a situation in which she could expect to be coerced 
is a particularly difficult requirement to construe as evidentiary . A defendant ' s  
level o f  fear is presumably unrelated to the way i n  which she came to be subject 
to coercion in the first place . 
Voluntarists should reject the rule that duress is unavailable as a defense 
to murder.68 If a person overcome by threats to his life submits to orders that 
he take the l ife of another, although he cannot be praised, the loss of control 
under the circumstances is exonerating,  on this theory . The restriction ,  
moreover, i s  arguably incoherent on a psychological theory of the defense, 
since a person is  not more in control when he murders than when he commits a 
lesser crime.69 Voluntarists should also reject the classic distinction between 
natural and man-made threats, focusing instead entirely on state of mind. This 
distinction is  both i l logical and unnecessary from a subj ective point of view:  
iilogical because the core of the defense is a psychological state, rather than an 
external circumstance, and unnecessary because duress and necessity are 
distinguished from one another by the fact that one is an excuse and the other a 
justification .  In addition ,  voluntarists should reject the other marginal 
requirement for the defense, namely that the defendant' s behavior constitute 
obedience to a direct order from a coercer. Fear- induced behavior should be 
excused regardless of the specific relation between the threat and the action 
performed. Not surprisingly, then, we find that proponents of the voluntarist 
conception allow duress as a defense to prison escape under appropriate 
6 8 .  Some voluntarists seem indeed to rej ect the restriction. See FLETCHER, supra note 
65, at 83 1-33 .  
5 9 .  See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1 2, at 433 n . 4 .  
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circumstances.70 
B. Hybrid Approaches 
While a purely voluntarist rationale for the defense appears problematic, 
tempering it with some objective elements greatly improves its plausibility. The 
MPC provides a clear statutory example of a modified, or "hybrid," subj ective 
approach. It solves the problem of idiosyncratic agents by adoptin g  a 
"reasonable person" standard on the question of ability to resist. Section 2 .09 
defines duress as follows: 
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged i n  the conduct 
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the 
use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person 
of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation 
would have been unable to resist. 7 1 
As discussed in  the Explanatory Note to this Code S ect ion ,  the 
requirement that the "person of reasonable firmness" have been unable to resist 
is an objective element .  The psychological nature of the approach, however, 
remains in the fact that the exonerating element is the agent' s inability to resist. 
Whether the agent does the right thing in not resisting is i rrelevant, as i s  shown 
by the fact that Section 3 .02, which sets out the basic lesser evils defense, i s  not 
limited to situations in which nature is the source of the choice. If Section 2 .09 
were a lesser evils provision, Section 3 .02 would be redundant. Assuming it i s  
not  redundant, Section 2 .09 must cover situations in which the actor cannot 
justify his conduct on lesser evils grounds, but in which his behavior must still 
be excused. As the Commentary to Section 2.09 says, 
The problem of Section 2.09 . . . reduces to the question of whether there 
are cases where the actor cannot j ustify his conduct under Section 3 .02, 
as when his choice involves an equal or greater evil than that threatened, 
but where he nonetheless should be excused because he was subj ected 
to coercion. 
The reasonableness standard is a familiar way to cope with variations in 
individual fortitude when a provision' s basic approach is psychological . B ut its 
importance underscores the inability of the psychological theory to provide a 
comp l e te rationale for the defense. The voluntarist theory combined with a 
reasonableness condition makes a unified rationale for the defense impossible. It 
will be recalled that the possibility of accounting for the defense in terms of 
multiple rationales has already been rej ected. 72 The approach i s  therefore 
theoretically unsatisfying .  The sought-for unity of explanation would be 
maintained if the reasonableness standard were an evidentiary rule. But  first, as 
discussed above, such a rule would have to be rebuttable to be consistent with 
the voluntarist rationale. Second, the defense probably should not be extended 
to idiosyncratic agents. There is thus a normative aspect to the reasonableness 
standard which the evidentiary rationale fai l s  to capture . 
A further problem with the MPC approach,  however, is that there is a 
risk that duress will col lapse into the conditions which negate the basic elements 
of the crime.73 Many of the conditions which undermine the act requirement of 
7 0 .  See People v .  Luther, 232 N.W.2d. i 84 (Mich. 1 97 5 ) ;  see also supra notes 35-36. 
7 1 .  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09( ! )  ( 1 980) (emphasis added). 
7 2 .  See supra Part L 
7 3 .  \'his i s  also a probiem with "pure" voluntarist theories. 
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the criminal law proceed by negating the voluntariness of the actor' s behavior, 
and negation of voluntariness is also the core of the voluntarist approach to 
duress. On the voluntarist conception, duress exonerates because i t  eliminates 
the actor' s power of choice, much in the same way that having one ' s  hand 
closed around the handle of a knife by another eliminates choice. But as the 
Commentary to MPC Section 2.09 says :  
If  [the actor] is so  far overwhelmed by force that h i s  behavior is  
involuntary, as when his  arm is physically moved by someone else, 
Section 2.01 ( 1 )  stands as a barrier to liability, following in this respect the 
long tradition of the penal law. The case of concern here is that in which 
the actor makes a choice, but claims in his defense that he was so 
intimidated that he was unable to choose otherwise. Should such 
psychological incapacity be given the same exculpative force as the 
physical incapacity that may afford a defense under Section 2.0 1 ?  
A s  the above passage makes clear, the problem i s  that the actus reus 
requirement found in MPC Section 2.01  covers the condition of an agent who 
acts, but who acts involuntarily, and Section 2 .01  gives no indication that i t  is 
meant to cover the case of coercion. The forms of involuntary behavior l isted 
in that section are l imited to reflex movements or convul sions ,  bodily 
movements made while unconscious or during sleep, behavior under hypnosis,  
or bodily movements that are "not a product of the effort or determination of 
the actor, either conscious or habituaJ . "74 Arguably the kind of involuntariness 
duress creates is somewhat different, and although Section 2.0 1 can perhaps 
provide an analogy, it is not itself meant to cover such cases. The Commentary 
supports this interpretation.  The problem, however, is that it is not clear what 
other sort of involuntariness there can be,  that i s ,  what non-physical 
involuntariness might mean. 
Fletcher' s answer to this question invokes the notion of normative 
involuntariness . 7 5  His approach is a hybrid voluntarist conception, since it 
combines the basic voluntarist rationale for the defense with a normative 
element. According to Fletcher, the movements of a person whose hand is 
forcibly closed around the handle of a knife are involuntary in a physical sense. 
The ordinary cases of duress we have been considering, however, are examples 
of normative or moral involuntariness. Fletcher does not explore how one 
might determine when conduct is involuntary in a moral , as opposed to a 
physical sense,  except that unl ike physical involuntariness ,  normative 
involuntariness "depends in a curious way on the competing interests as in cases 
of justification."76 He concludes that when "the gap between the harm done and 
the benefit  accrued becomes too great, the act is more l ikely to appear 
voluntary and therefore inexcusable . "??  A person cannot claim that he is 
coerced by threats that his finger will be broken into destroying the rest of the 
worl d . 7 8 On the other hand, Fletcher says, "conduct may be perceived as 
morally involuntary even though the cost is substantial ly greater than the 
7 4 .  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.0 l (2)(d) ( 1 9 80).  
7 5 .  FLETCHER, supra note 65,  at 803 . 
7 6 .  !d. ; see also George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 4 7 
S .  CAL L.  REV. 1 269,  1 276 ( 1 974) .  ("Whether conduct appears to be i nvoluntary depends, in 
part, on the competing interests at  stake.") .  
7 7 .  FLETCHER, supra note 65,  at 804 .  
7 8 .  !d. 
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benefi t  gained."79 The example he  gives is of  a person who kills another in  
order to avoid mutilation of  his  own body. He points out  correctly that we are 
often excused in the latter sort of case according to common notions  of  
morality. This is clearly a result the welfarist conception cannot support. 
While Fletcher' s classification of the cases is supported by the ethical 
judgments we make about them, the fact that we regard a defendant threatened 
with a broken finger as fully culpable and a defendant threatened with 
mutilation as blameless does not imply that the cases should be distinguished 
from one another by the concept of "voluntariness ." That we blame in the 
former case does entail that we regard the act as voluntary , but that w e  
exonerate i n  the latter case does n o t  entail lack of voluntariness .  The 
involuntariness of killing to avoid mutilation would have to be established on 
independent grounds, and "dependence on competing interests" is  unlikely to 
supply those grounds. 
It is the contention of thi s  Article that duress does not involve 
involuntariness of any sort. The clear examples of physical involuntariness­
reflex motions, epileptic seizures, having one ' s  limbs moved by someone else­
are irrelevant for understanding coerced behavior. Individuals whose physical 
movements are controlled by forces outside themselves, or outside their 
conscious minds, cannot conceivably choose to behave otherwise. Although a 
person acting because she fears for her life may feel as though she has no 
control over whether to do the act, she surely controls the act in precisely the 
way that she controls non-coerced movements . This is what is entailed by 
saying she performs the act intentionally in both cases. Furthermore, there is 
little doubt that responses to coercion can be affected by training. Soldiers may 
Jearn to increase their resistance to torture, and they may even learn to accept 
death rather than to betray the values for which they are fighting .  Reflex 
movements and epileptic seizures, on the other hand, are unlikely to be affected 
by training. 
I t  appears, then, that the voluntarist rationale cannot explain the basic 
elements of the defense, since that theory cannot be sensibly maintained without 
interjecting certain normative elements. A mixed account of this sort, among its 
other drawbacks, does not satisfy the condition of theoretical unity which has 
been this Article ' s  objective. What is required is a single conceptual framework 
that can accommodate both normative and psychological elements. 
V. DURESS AND THE N ATURE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
The welfarist and the voluntarist conceptions depend on the s ame basic 
account of responsibility. Both assume that what a person does intentionally is 
necessarily an appropriate obj ect of moral assessment. Exoneration i s  only 
possible, therefore, if the thing done intentionally turns out to be good, 
meaning that it brings about an improvement in the social welfare. 
To spell out the common assumption of the two conceptions,  we might 
say they are committed to the following Principle of Responsibility (call it 
"PR") :  An agent is morally responsible for everything she does intentionally. In 
other words, agents are morally responsible for all the intended consequences 
of their intentional actions. PR has no bearing on situations in which an agent is 
7 9 .  !d. at 803 . 
! 
i J 
1 
j 
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held morally responsible for things she did not do intentionally. That is ,  neither 
of the standard views assumes that agents are responsible for all and only their 
intentional doings.  What P R does do is severely restrict the grounds for 
exonerating an agent for the bad consequences she intends :  the only basis for 
exonerating intentional conduct is justification .  It follows that one can only 
avoid blame for a socially inefficient act if the thing done was not done 
intentionally .  It is in virtue of their commitment to PR, then, that the standard 
theories limit the withholding of blame for the violation of a prohibitory norm 
to situations in which the behavior is either justified or involuntary. 
The term "responsibility" is a nebulous one. In the context of P R ,  the 
expression has moral connotations .  That is ,  it incorporates the upshot of a 
moral inquiry into the characterization of the relation between the agent and the 
thing she does. The moral usage is a common one. We often say someone is not 
"responsible" for an occurrence, when what we mean is that, although she 
brought i t  about on purpose, she is not to blame. What often goes u nrecognized, 
however, is that we sometimes use the term to characterize a non-moral 
relation between an agent and one of her doings. This should be clear from the 
fact that we can say an agent i s  responsible for something she did in a case in 
which the thing done is morally neutral, that is, when the action or consequence 
is neither good nor bad. When we say, for example, that someone went for a 
walk, or brushed her teeth, or pulled up her socks, we understand the agent as 
responsible for what she does, but we do not, in the usual case, regard her as 
subject to praise or blame for it . The question of moral evaluation simply does 
not arise. The expression "responsibility" should be taken to signify the non­
moral agency relation that holds prior to moral judgment between an agent and 
certain of her actions, whereas the expression "moral responsibility" should be 
understood as referring to the upshot of moral evaluation. The thesis of this 
Article might therefore be put as the claim that the gap between responsibility 
and moral  responsibility allows for an extension of the concept of excuse: 
excused conduct should include cases in which the agent is responsible for what 
she does in the non-moral sense and leave to one side cases in which the agent is 
responsible in the moral sense. 
Another way to understand the suggestion of this Article is that we ought 
to drive a wedge between the notions of intentional action and moral 
responsibility .  That is, doing something intentionally should not be thought to 
entail moral  responsibility for the thing done . Once this is understood, a space 
opens up in which a revised conception of excuse can operate : someone can 
have an excuse for fully intentional conduct, despite the fact that the thing she 
did is not something she was justified in doing. Duress, then, is indeed an 
excuse, but, it will be suggested, the concept of excuse should not be restricted 
to lack of responsibility . Instead, blame can be withheld from a responsible 
agent without that agent having adopted the best course of action under the 
circumstances. An individual can perform a bad act and yet not be culpable, 
even though his behavior was fully intentional. 
This middle road incorporates some of the benefi ts of each of the 
surroundin g  alternatives. On the one hand, it recognizes the relevance of 
psychological features .  On the other hand, it provides the central advantage of 
the welfarist conception in recognizing that agents acting under duress exercise 
choice. The bank robbery performed on pain of death , for example, may 
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require an extended period of  planning and a significant exercise of deliberative 
rati onality. Indeed, what the coercer does is to appeal to the deliberative 
faculties of the defendant: the coercer provides the defendant with particularly 
strong reasons for acting, and when the defendant complies, he acts for those 
reasons. The resulting action performed under duress i s  thus fully i ntentional, 
since it i s  action done for a reason. so 
The proposed approach al so  makes sense of a number of the 
requirements of the defense. On this view , it is coherent to restrict the plea to 
actions performed in  protection of particularly strong interests , such as one ' s  
interest in  one' s own life and bodily security and those o f  loved ones . I t  may be 
excusable that people protect loved ones in situations in which the same actions 
would not be excusable if undertaken on behalf of strangers . The asymmetry 
between loved ones and strangers can be maintained because actions that are 
permissible, on this view, need only be understandable. They need not  be 
morally commendable. In addit ion,  unreasonable preferences-such as a 
preference for expending a human life to save a material possession-need not 
be accommodated, even if the same sense of urgency affects the actor i n  that 
case as it does another, less peculiar actor threatened with death or serious 
bodily injury. This is because the approach is  normative, albeit normative in  a 
weak sense, based on a descriptive theory of psychological normality . 
Other requirements-that the defendant have had no opportun i ty to 
escape from the situation, that the threat was imminent, and that the defendant 
not have placed herself voluntarily in a s ituation in which she could expect to be 
coerced-can be explained as features of the situation that bear on whether the 
actor' s  behavior was understandable under the circumstances. The last of these 
requirements in particular affects whether the defendant appears deserving  of 
our sympathy: agents who join criminal organizations in some sense "assume 
the risk" of their activities . We are disinclined to believe that performing a 
criminal act is anathema to them. In this case, the act seems consistent with a 
negative view of the agent, since there is no basis for regarding i t  as an 
exceptional event in the life of an otherwise moral person. 
Consider now how the proposed approach would apply to cases of 
mistake. Where a defendant reasonably but mistakenly believes she has a valid 
duress defense, her conduct is excu sed . The same character considerations that 
exonerate agents in duress cases where no mistake is made apply to the mistaken 
actor. And since duress is already an excuse, on this view, rather than a 
justification, there is no reason to analyze cases of this sort under the heading of 
"mistake" rather than "duress," as there is on the welfarist conception.  
The second sort of mistake case is also unproblematic on the proposed 
view. Where a defendant is unaware of the existence of an excuse, there can be 
no exoneration in this case: no pressure operates on the mind of the defendant, 
and therefore character considerations have no opportunity to arise. 
The jurisprudential obstacle to expressing the character view of duress in 
a legal standard is that Anglo-American law lacks a conceptual niche for a 
defense conceived i n  the suggested way. The traditional excuses- insanity, 
mistake, etc .-impugn the defendant' s agency . In other words, excuses in our 
system tend to negative culpability by deny ing voluntariness .  It is because 
8 0 .  See DAVIDSON. ACiions, Reasons and Causes. supra note 2 .  
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justification i s  the only current theory of exoneration that Anglo-American law 
takes refuge in  welfarist rationales for a legal rule such as duress .  It i s  not 
surprising, then, that the welfarist conception of duress is the more prevalent of 
the two standard theories in the legal literature. 
Consider, by way of contrast, the defense of "excusing necessity" found 
in Section 35 of the Gerrnan Criminal Code. This Section provides: 
Whoever commits an unlawful act in order to prevent a present danger 
to the l ife, limb or liberty of himself, a relative or a close person acts 
without guilt. However this does not apply if under the circumstances, 
and in particular if he has brought about the danger or has a special legal 
obligation, the perpetrator should be expected to cope with the 
danger . 8 1  
The provision clearly does not advance a justification :  i t  exonerates 
agents under the specified conditions without regard to social welfare . Under 
the terms of the provision, an individual could take a life to save himself from 
death or serious bodily injury .  The defense is nevertheless not predicated on 
involuntariness .  That the approach is not concerned with voluntariness emerges 
clearly in the last sentence of the quoted passage: where the perpetrator cannot 
fairly be expected to cope, his behavior need not be involuntary , and 
conversely, where the perpetrator can fairly be expected to cope, his behavior 
need not be voluntary . A person might decide in a cool moment, for example, 
that he simply would not be able to cope with seeing a loved one killed. He 
realizes that it would induce madness, or that it would simply be unbearable. He 
takes rational measures to avoid the eventuality ; these need not be involuntary 
simply because he acts in fear. While the possibili ty of voluntary behavior 
presumably provides a necessary but not sufficient condition for the fairness of 
requiring a person to stand firm in the face of a threat, the two concepts are 
analytically distinct. 
What it is reasonable to expect of a person depends on various non­
psychological , or social factors, such as the role  the defendant plays in society. 
A fireman, for example, may rightfully be regarded as having assumed special 
duties that require her to refrain from acting on highly personal preferences in 
certain ci rcumstances . s2 A state actor may be required to act w ith a n  eye 
towards the social welfare alone . But  the private actor wil l  not usually be  
condemned for preferring his own welfare and the welfare of  those with whom 
he has special bonds over the welfare of strangers . Although the German 
approach is at least partially psychological , it differs from the highly subj ective 
approaches to duress encountered sometimes in American juri sprudence in that 
it does not require the agent to have lost control or to lack the capaci ty to 
confom1 her behavior to the law. 
The German approach also obviates the need to distinguish situations 
caused by natural forces from those caused by human forces, s ince there is a 
non-artificial way to distinguish duress from necessity . The Gennan Code, for 
example, includes all necess i ty and duress defenses where the conduct is 
exonerat ing, but not commendable, under the personal necessi ty provision of 
Secion 35 .  It  reserves another sect ion,  number 34,  for similar si tuation s  where 
8 I .  STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] § 3 5  (f.R .G . )  (translation in Albin Eser, )usnfication 
and Excuse, 24 AM . . J. COivlP.  L.  62 i ,  636-37 n. 8 1  ( 1 976)) .  
8 2 .  See Eser ,  supra note 8 1 ,  at 636-37.  
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the defense is a justification, rather than an excuse. Section 34 is a proper lesser 
evi ls  defense. It reads: 
Whoever in a present and otherwise not preventable danger to life ,  limb, 
liberty, honor, property or any other legal interest acts to prevent the 
damage to be inflicted on himself or another person, does not act 
unl awfully if the balance of the conflicting interests, in particular the 
legal interest involved and the intensity of the imminent danger, shows 
that the defended interest is entitled to prevail over the one which is 
infringed . This is admissible, however, only in so far as the act is an 
adequate means for preventing the damage.s3 
Unlike Section 35,  this section allows a defendant to claim the defense for 
actions performed to protect any legal interest. It is thus a consistent application 
of the lesser evils defense. Its operation in conjunction with Section  35 is 
coherent, moreover, since behavior undertaken under the defense provided by 
Section 34, which turns out to be mistaken, may be excusable under Section 
3 5 . 84 The lesser evi ls  defense only justifies behavior which is in fact socially 
beneficial .  Since behavior excused under Section 35 might also be welfare­
maximizing, some cases would presumably be covered by both provisions. The 
natural division among cases, however, is for criminal acts performed for the 
sake of compelling personal interests to be defended under Section 3 5 ,  and for 
those performed by actors with no personal stake to fall under Section 34. 
In an article on excuse, George Fletcher compares our legal system 
unfavorably to the German system. ss He criticizes Anglo-American law for 
fail ing to make a place for "individual ized" excusing conditions ,  that is ,  
conditions that do not  stem from the application of a legal rule ,  and which take 
seriously "differences among persons and situations."S6 Common law courts, in 
his  opinion, "have been loath to recognize necessity , duress, insanity and 
mistake of law as defenses relating to the character of the doer rather than to 
the quality of the deed," with the result that " [n]ecessity and duress sometimes 
emerge as justificatory defenses . . .  , as c laims that the act is right and 
commendable, rather than that the actor should be disassociated from wrongful 
conduct . " 8 7  He argues that German law is  quite different on questions of 
culpability : 
[T]he contemporary German style of thought stresses the centrality of 
codificati on and legislative supremacy in  defining prohibited conduct. 
Yet at the lev'=! of assessing individual culpability, the German courts 
culti vate a sy stem of individualized excusing conditi ons .  The 
indispensable inquiry in every case is whether the defendant, as a 
concrete individual, can be fairly blamed for having violated the law. 88 
At least where duress is concerned, Fletcher' s argument that courts 
should focus on the individual seems correct. Focusing on the individual , 
however, does not imply that the excusing  condi tion must i tself  be 
"individualized," namely not subj ect to application by a rule.  The notion of 
8 3 .  StGB § 34 (translation i n  Eser, supra note 8 1 ,  at 634 n .65) .  
8 4 .  Recal l ,  however, that there i s  a difference i n  scope between the two provis ions .  
B eh avior which the actor mistakenly believed to be covered by § 34 would not be covered by § 
3 5  if it were undertaken to guard against an evil less serious than death or serious bodily injury .  
8 5 .  See generally Fletcher, supra note 76 .  
8 6 .  !d. at  1 300 . 
8 7 .  !d. at 1 272.  
8 8 .  /d. at 1 3 00-0 1 .  
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governance by legal principle, rather than by ad hoc commands of a ruler, 
requires that courts or legislatures fashion and publicize rules, and proceed to 
apply them as fairly as possible. The difficult question is  what kind of rule we 
should have to govern exoneration,  not whether or not to have rules.  A rule­
governed theory need not be impersonal or ignore character traits: personal or 
psychological features can be incorporated into rules as easily as obj ective or 
normative conditions . The only l imits to tying legal rules to mentalistic 
elements are evidentiary, but there i s  no a priori reason for excluding such 
features from rules. 
It is also important to realize that one need not equate the personalized 
with the subj ective. A defense can be personal to the actor without being 
strongly psychological. For example, good character i s  personal to the actor, 
but a rule that turned on it would not depend on the presence or absence of 
occurrent psychological states .  One might, therefore, attempt to push Anglo­
American jurisprudence further than Fletcher does and reject the idea that the 
only way to focus on the doer, rather than on the deed, i s  to discover 
psychological peculiarities of an agent that negate culpability. It i s  possible for a 
personalized defense focusing on doers rather than on deeds to w arrant 
exoneration on normative grounds. 
VI. THE ROLE OF D ISPOSITIONS 
The previous Part pointed i n  the direction of a different approach to 
duress .  It did not, however, explore why an actor who acts under duress should 
be excused. This Part argues that we excuse actors who perform criminal acts 
under duress because the decision to bring about harm in such cases stems from 
accepted dispositions, dispositions that are constitutive of human nature, at least 
for virtuous agents. 
People who have good dispositions, and who attach value to the things 
they should value, may encounter s i tuations in  which continuing to act 
according to their dispositions will lead them to harmful acts. Suppose they 
form attachments to family and friends. These attachments are generally 
applauded. Indeed, something more can be said about such dispositions, which 
is that they seem to lie at the heart of what it is  to be a person. This 
fundamental disposition, or set of dispositions ,  creates an asymmetry in the 
obligations to which we hold one another. That we form attachments, for 
example,  makes strangers seem less deserving of our time and energy than 
those with whom we hold special bonds. A similar story can be told about self­
preservation . People generally prefer their own preservation to that of others , 
at least others with whom they do not have special bonds .  This i s  not a 
disposition we seek to eliminate.  Having nurtured and protected the 
development of these strong asymmetric commitments, we will be unable to 
abandon them in rare, unexpected situations in which it might be better from 
the standpoint of the general social welfare to act contrary to the disposition. 
Because we recognize and identify with these dispositions, we excuse agents in 
cases in which their otherwise wrongful actions fol low directly from 
dispositions of this sort .  
This idea may be a t  the core of  Aristotle ' s  account of  duress, although his 
remarks on the subject are all too brief. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
says that actions performed under duress are ones in which a person performs a 
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forbidden action "under pressure which overstrains human nature and which no  
one  could withstand."89 By "human nature" he  means the dispositions of choice 
and patterns of behavior that are distinctively characteristic of human beings . If 
we know anything about Aristotle' s views of human l ife, we know two things:  
first, that all  human action aims at "happiness,"90 and second, that human beings 
are characteristically "political ,"  meaning that they realize their good in  
association with others .9 1  It follows that the end of  human action i s  one' s own 
well-being and the well-being of one ' s  family and friends. It thus "overstrains 
human nature" to require human beings to refrain from acts on which the most 
essential human ends depend. 
One might wish to object that Aristotle ' s  point must be about involuntary 
behavior, since failure to "withstand" pressure might simply mean giving i n  to 
irresistible impul ses .  What else could i t  mean for a person to respond to 
pressure which "overstrains human nature," other than that the person cannot 
control her response to the threat? But just as the German rule presupposes a 
distinction between involuntary action and inabil ity to cope, the n ot ion of 
overstraining human nature need not be cashed out in terms of involuntariness 
either. Aristotle' s more general ethical philosophy offers us a conception of 
responsibility which explains why this is so. 
For Aristotle, the category of voluntary action i s  a broad one.  I t  includes 
acts of animals and children as well as adult action .92 There are two types of 
voluntary action: action which follows deliberation, which stems from choice,93 
and action which is not preceded by deliberation. Aristotle draws the distinction 
by saying: "Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the 
voluntary ; the latter extends more widely .  For both children and the other 
animals share in voluntary action ,  but not in choice . . . .  "94 The actions of 
children and animals are voluntary, but they do not stem from choice. 
Aristotle also says that voluntary actions are subj ect to praise and blame, 
and that involuntary actions are not. Those actions are voluntary which are not 
rendered involuntary by either compulsion or ignorance .95 Compulsion obtains 
when "the moving principle is outside" the agent.96 Aristotle explains this as "a 
principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or i s  
feeling the passion, e .g .  if he were to  be carried somewhere by a wind ,  or by 
8 9 .  A RISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in  THE COLLECTED W ORKS O F  A RISTOTLE § 
1 1 1 0(a)(25) (Jonathan B arnes ed.,  1 984) [hereinafter NE]. 
9 0 .  !d. § 1 097(b)(20). "Happiness" i s  the standard translation of "eudaimonia." 
9 l .  Aristotle says "man i s  by nature a political animal ." ARISTOTLE, Politics, in TH E 
COLLECTED WORKS OF A RISTOTLE § 1 1 1 0(a)(25) (Jonathan B arnes ed . ,  1 984) .  
9 2 .  NE, supra note 89,  § l l l l (b) (7-9 ) .  
9 3 .  Voluntary action that is not the product of choice i s  the product of appeti te or 
passion.  I t  i s  considerations such as these that lead Aristotle to the conclusion that " . . .  the 
voluntary [is] not. . .  defined either by desire or by choice." ARISTOTLE. Eudemian Ethics, in  THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ARISTOTLE § 1 225(b)( l )  (Jonathan B arnes ed., 1 984). Neither appetite 
nor deliberation is part of the definition of voluntariness, implying that neither acting on an 
appetite nor failing to deliberate prior to performing an action renders an act involuntary. 
9 4 .  NE, supra note 89, § l l l l (b) (7- 1 0).  
9 5 .  In the Magna Moralia, however, Aristotle treats compulsion as the only condition that 
renders an act involuntary :  "Roughly speaking, that is voluntary which we do when not u nder 
compuls ion ."  A RISTOTLE, lv!agna Moralia, in THE COLLECTED W ORKS OF A RISTOTLE § 
1 1 87(b)(35)  (Johnathan B arnes ed . ,  1 984) .  
9 6 .  NE, supra note 89,  § l l ! O(a)( l -2) .  
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men who had him in  their power. "97 Ignorance, sometimes translated as 
"error," falls  i nto several different categories, not all of which exempt an 
action from praise and blame. The kind of ignorance that makes an action 
i nvoluntary is i gnorance of  particulars ,  which is i gnorance of  the 
"circumstances of the action and the objects with which it i s  concerned."98 It 
follows that the actions of animal's and children are subject to praise and blame, 
as long as they are not caused by something outside the agent and there is no 
ignorance of the particulars surrounding the act. 
It also seems to follow that actions  performed under duress are 
voluntary, and that they are therefore subject to praise and blame. The actors in 
such cases make no perceptual mistake, and the movements they make are 
initiated by them, i . e . ,  the acts are not caused by an external force .  The few 
remarks Aristotle makes on duress confirm this  reading. He says that although 
actions of thi s sort are "mixed," the person who performs them acts 
voluntarily, "for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in 
such actions is in [the man, ]  and the things of which the moving principle is in a 
man himself are in his power to do or not to do."99 
Although Ari stotle makes his posit ion reasonably clear, some 
commentators do not believe that Aristotle could have meant what he said. 
Terry Irwin, for example, concedes that Aristotle treats the voluntary as 
sufficient for responsibil i ty ,  but he nevertheless thinks i t  obvious that 
responsibility is more closely tied to rational agency than this equation of 
responsibility with the voluntary suggests, and equally obvious that Aristotle 
agrees. 1oo Aristotle, according to Irwin, is confused by his own lights, thinking 
"he has found a criterion for responsible action when he seems to have found 
only a criterion for voluntary action . " l O l Assuming that Aristotle meant to 
"connect[] responsibility more closely with rational agency," 102 Irwin attempts 
to show that Aristotle actually "takes responsible action to require something 
more than these minimal conditions . " l 03 But nothing more i s  in fact required, 
and it is a mistake to try to rewrite Aristotle on this point. 
Aristotle ' s  understanding of the voluntary is not inadequate to ground the 
non-moral notion of responsibility presented above. l 04 His account of the 
voluntary is only too minimal if it is treated as a foundation for the moral sense 
of the term. But, as discussed in Part V, to say that an action is voluntary , or to 
say that an agent is responsible for a certain occurrence, is not to make a moral 
j udgment. It is instead to make a j udgment that the agent satisfies a threshold 
condition for moral judgment, that is, she has caused something  to happen 
which she must own. This is to say no more than that she has done something 
for a reason , where the reason is explanatory of her behavior. As discussed 
9 7 .  !d. § 1 1 1 0(a) (2-4) .  
9 8 .  ld. § 1 1 1 0(b) (33-34).  
9 9 .  !d. § 1 1 1  O(a) ( 1 1 - 1 7 ) .  While it is clear that Aristotle rejects a voluntarist account of 
duress,  i t  is  s l ightly more difficult  to show that he rejects a lesser evils rationale .  The strongest 
direct evidence for this stems from the fact that the lesser evils rationale does not cover all cases 
in which agents should be exonerated, according to Aristotle .  He says that " [o]n some actions 
praise indeed is not bestowed, but forgiveness is  . . .  " Jd. § l ! I O(a) (23-24). 
1 00. TERENCE H .  IRWIN, ARISTOTLE ' S  FIRST PRINCIPLES § 1 82 ( 1 988)  
1 0 1 .  !d. 
1 02.  !d. 
1 03.  id. 
1 04. See supra Part Y .  
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above, ws to say that an  agent does something for a reason is to  say that she does 
the thing intentionally .  It is the mere fact that an agent acts for a reason that 
determines whether the thing done is done intentionally. The content of the 
reason is irrelevant. It is only once i t  i s  clear that a person h as acted 
intentionally that we can call her to account for what she has done. Whether we 
regard her as culpable will depend on the content of the reason she gives.  
Responsibility, then,  in the non-moral sense turns only on the fo rm of the 
action:  the action must be something the agent did for a reason in order for the 
agent to be responsible for it. Moral responsibility, by contrast, requires more. 
It requires that we regard the content  of the agent ' s  reason for acting as 
inadequate to excuse or to justify her conduct. 
The distinction between moral and non-moral forms of responsibility 
also sheds brighter light on Aristotle' s comments about praise and blame. When 
he says that all voluntary action is subject to praise and blame, he does not mean 
praise and blame to be understood as varieties of moral responsibility . Moral 
assessment, unlike praise and blame, pertains to human character. It is not 
applicable to individual acts, even acts which reflect choice. There are thus two 
kinds of judgment at issue: judgment of action and judgment of character, or to 
be more precise, j udgment of agents in light of their actions and j udgment of 
agents in light of their characters . 
Judgment of agents in light of their actions is strictly speaking non-moral 
in form. It is the means by which the moral capacities are developed, since at 
least in human beings, praising and blaming actions will issue in states of 
character. Character, as Aristotle says, i s  acquired "from the exercise of 
activities on particular objects ," I 06 that is ,  through the performance of actions 
of a certain kind. Human beings will presumably perform actions more often 
when they are rewarded for them, and will cease to perform those for which 
they are punished. The repeated performance of virtuous action thus leads to 
the development of a virtuous character, and l ikewise with vice. In short,  the 
ethical capacities of persons are acquired through habituation, and praise and 
blame are devices for encouraging the performance of good actions  and 
discouraging the performance of bad actions .  Praise and blame are thus not 
themselves varieties of moral assessment. 
Moral assessment, by contrast, is a judgment about the state of a person ' s 
character, taken as a whole.  This applies only to beings capable of choice, and 
thus animals and children below a certain age cannot be judged as agents . 
Character-judgment is ethical in nature, since agents with developed characters 
are moral agents . They can be j udged as good or bad persons in toto. 
Derivative from this second sort of evaluation is a notion of moral judgment of 
agents for their actions: actions acquire their ethical quality from the \vay in 
which they depend on and reveal the ethical constitution of agents . But this type 
of evaluation is only appropriate if ( 1 )  the being in question is a being w ith a 
character, and (2) the action i n  virtue of which the agent is being j udged is 
i tself reflective of choice . The most important element of this conception for 
our purposes has to do with this last point: that an action is reflective of choice 
means that the action is  parti cularly revelatory of the agent' s character. As 
Aristotle says, choice is "thought to be most closely bound up with virtue and to 
1 05 .  See supra text accompanying note 80. 
1 06 .  NE, supra note 89, § 1114(a) (5-6) .  
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discriminate characters better than actions do . " I07 We examine chosen action ,  
then, in order to  learn something about the chooser' s  character. 
On an Aristotelian conception, we can understand duress in the following 
way . A person acting under duress performs an action which, prima facie, 
merits a negative j udgment. This judgment indicates the appropriateness of 
punishment. But the prima facie judgment is inaccurate in the case of an action 
performed under duress, because a j udgment of character supersedes the act­
based judgment. There is thus a failure of implication from bad act to bad 
character. Although the action performed under duress is of a type to result in 
poor character formation and thus would normally require discouragement 
through punishment, the dispositions in the service of which the action is 
performed make a different sort of judgment applicable. Dispositions of the 
agent, such as love of family and friends or a strong commitment to self­
preservation, transfer to the action in the derivative sense explained above, and 
the action can thus be judged as a reflection of character, rather than as an 
isolated act. Because the person who acts under duress is revealed as acting in 
harmony with his good dispositions in  a case of duress, the badness of the act 
does not require the normal pedagogic response. 
The usual danger of inculcating bad dispositions by allowing or fai ling to 
punish bad acts can fail to apply, then, because human beings with developed 
characters, and a clear conception of the good, will not have their characters 
influenced by acts which already stem from a firmly developed disposition. The 
bad act is excused, because it fol lows from the good disposition.  Animals and 
children, by contrast, could not be excused in this fashion, since they develop 
dispositions of a very different sort. Bad acts wil l  always contribute to bad 
dispositions for them, since acts turn rigidly into dispositions solely in virtue of 
repeated performance. The absence of character formation, and with it ,  the 
absence of the faculty of choice, means that there is nothing to stand between 
the act and the development of a disposition to act in the way dictated by the 
disposition. One is left with praise and blame, reward and punishment. Ethical 
assessment, therefore, applies only to human conduct. 
It is sometimes said that actions performed under duress should be 
excused because the usual inference from conduct to character cannot be made. 
Fletcher, for example, puts the point thus :  
The distinguishing feature of excusing conditions is that they preclude 
an inference from the act to the actor' s character. Typically, if a bank 
teller opens a safe and turns money over to a stranger, we can infer that 
he is dishonest. B ut if he does all  this at gunpoint,  we cannot infer 
anything one way or the other about his honesty . 1 08 
The account presented in this Article reverses Fletcher' s analysis .  In the 
normal case of punishment, there is l ittle or no attention paid to character. We 
do not punish an act because we think the actor evi l .  We punish the act because 
the act is wrong, even if the actor i s  a good person. Duress appears as an 
I 07.  !d. § 1 1 1 1  (b) (5-6) .  For a general d iscussion of the distinction between judgment of 
character and judgment of actions, see Claire Finkel stein, Tort Law as a Comparative Institution: 
Reply to Perry, 1 5  HARV. J. LAW & PUB.  POL ' Y  939, 950 ( 1 992) .  
I 08.  FLETCHER, supra note 65 ,  at 799-800. He goes on to say that "the same breakdo''ifl 
in the reasoning from conduct to character occurs in  cases of insanity . . . . " !d. He thus believes 
that this is  a feature that characterizes excuses generally . B u t  with at least some sons of insani ty,  
i t  seems difficult to speak of an underlying character which is preserved. 
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exception, a case in which we put  the act-judgment to  one side because of a 
countervailing character-judgment. What follows is a suspension of punishment, 
or an exo n e ra tion  of the agent, which the agent receives as a spec ial  
dispensation for acting on good motives. Allowing character judgment to enter 
into the practice of punishment is the exception, rather than the rule. Most of 
the other excuses do pertain to voluntariness, and the conventional wisdom 
about the irrelevance of character should continue to apply to those cases. 
At least two other defenses, however, appear to lend themselves to a 
character-based analysis :  provocation suggests that the defendant ' s  v iolent 
reaction is at least partially understandable, although not commendable, in  light 
of the extraordinary situation in which he found himself. A relatively virtuous 
person might react badly when confronted with pressures of an unusual n ature. 
Like duress, provocation has often been treated as a defense bas ed on 
i nvoluntariness . 1 09 Entrap:•1ent i :; now explicitly treated as a character-related 
defense, since, under the prevail ing "subj ective standard," the government must 
prove the defendant was "predisposed" to perform the criminal act i t  induced 
him to perform. 1 10 In addition, the defenses of battered women' s syndrome 1 1 1 
and black rage 1 1 2  might also derive more support from character considerations 
than from the idea that the agent' s conduct i s  involuntary. 
The foregoing analysis suggests certain conclusions about the distinction 
between excuse and j ustification generally .  Instead of distinguishing excuse 
from j ustification by the difference between involuntary and commendable 
conduct, the distinction lies in the stance society takes to the offender: where the 
basis for the defense is that the actor behaved understandably ,  given her 
personal stake in the situation, we excuse, even though the behavior is not 
commendable.  Where the actor' s own interests are not implicated, by contrast, 
we exonerate only where the behavior is justified, since the act enhances social 
util ity .  Although an actor can increase the general level of util ity even where 
personal interests are at stake, in such cases the actor' s reason for violating the 
prohibitory norm is the act ' s  effects on the actor' s own interests . The actor does 
not violate the prohibitory norm in order to improve social welfare . In short, 
where the reason for violating the prohibitory norm is agent-relative , 1 1 3  that is ,  
identified by its connection to the interests of the person whose reason i t  is ,  we 
demand only acceptance and understanding as a bas is  for exoneration .  By 
contrast, where the reason is agent-neutral, 1 1 4 that is ,  formulated for agents 
1 09 .  See M ichael S .  Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73  CAL. L.  REV. 1 09 1 ,  1 149 
( 1 9 8 5 ) . But see Joshua Dres< 1 er, Rc:.'z inking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search  of a 
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. 42 1 , 462 ( 1 9S2) .  
1 1 0 .  Mathev,;s v .  United States, 485  U.S .  58 ( 1 98 8 ) .  Commentators, however, ins i s t  on 
regarding entraped behavior as involuntary . See George P .  Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal 
Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1 263 ,  1 280 ( 1 985) .  
1 1 1 . See S tate v. Pascal ,  736 P .2d 1 064, 1 07 1 -72  (Wash.  1 987)  (treat ing  battered 
women' s syndrome as operating in mitigation of punishment based on diminished capacity ) ;  see 
genera l ly Anne I'v1 . Coughl in ,  Excusing Women,  82 CAL .  L .  R E V .  l ( 1 994)  (cr i t ic iz ing 
diminished capacity approaches to the battered woman syndrome defense). 
1 1 2 .  See State v.  Lamar, 698 P.2d 735 ,  74 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 984) (rejec ting the defense 
of "black rage"). 
1 1 3 .  Agent-relative reasons make essential reference to the person whose reason it i s ,  
whereas agent-neutrai reasons do not .  See DEREK PARFIT , REASONS AND PERSONS 1 4 3 
( 1 984) ;  see also THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 1 52-53 ( 1 986) ;  Finkelstein ,  
supra note 1 07, at  94LJ..-45 .  
1 1 4.  See supra note 1 ! 3 .  
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generally, we demand that the act be done for the sake of the greater good. 
This way of distinguishing excuse from justification, however, does have 
a somewhat counterintuitive resul t .  The case of the person threatened with 
death unless he robs the bank must be grouped with the case of the person who 
breaks into a cabin in the woods to keep himself from freezing to death, and 
both are placed under the heading of "duress." But  unless we can find a way of 
justifying the apparently spurious distinction between manmade and natural 
threats, there is no reason for treating these cases differently. The disinterested 
bystander who sets fire to a field to prevent a forest fire from engulfing a town 
acts for the sake of the greater good, rather than for interests of his own. It 
does not seem unreasonable to hold the disinterested agent to a higher standard 
of evaluation, since he does not require our understanding and sympathy. 
In  l i ght of  the suggested basis for distinguishing excuse from 
justification, certain general secondary characteristics of each become easier to 
understand. If justifications are characterized by the fact that they rest on agent­
neutral reasons for acting, it makes sense that thi rd parties can assist in the 
performance of justified acts . 1 1 s Where the reason for exoneration is personal 
to the actor, that is, where the reason for acting i s  agent-relative, third parties 
are appropriately barred from assisting, unless they share the excuse as well . 
Excuse and justification are also sometimes distingui shed in terms of  
rel iance. As Fletcher interestingly argues, one should not have a right to  rely 
on the availability of an excuse ex ante, but one should have the right to rely on 
a j ustification . t t 6 Distinguishing excuses from justifications in this way is 
plausible in  most cases. A defendant who argues she was insane or mistaken as 
to a factual matter at the time of the act could not also claim to have relied on 
rules governing insanity or mistake, on pain of contradiction. Justifications, by 
contrast, set out rules of conduct that individuals can use to guide their 
behavior, since the availability of a justification does not generally turn on the 
personal characteristics of the actor. 1 l7 Although the argument that excuses fail 
to generate a right of reliance may appear to depend on a conception of excuses 
as involving involuntary conduct, character-based excuses should resist reliance 
as wel l .  A character rationale for a certain act, such as loyalty , impl ies practical 
deliberation that takes place largely outside the ambit of legal incentives .  That 
an agent rel ied on the availabil ity of a defense seems more appropriate where 
the act was undertaken for obj ect ive reasons .  A change in law could 
dramatically affect the actor' s incentives in  the latter sort of case , but is 
unlikely to do so in the former. 
Against the background of an Aristotelian conception of responsibility ,  
then , we can afford to  rej ect the bifurca tion of defenses i nto lack of  
voluntariness, o n  the one hand, and justification on the other. This  i s  because an 
agent can fai l  to be mom.lly responsible for a chosen act .  All chosen acts are 
voluntary, since, as Aris totle says, the voluntary extends more widely than the 
chosen. To say that an act i s  chosen i s  therefore to say nt 8. minimum that the 
agent is responsible for it, in the non-rnoral sense, and that she can be called to 
account. The judgment we rnake of  the agent i n  l ight of her :::.tction will  then 
1 1 5 .  George Fletcher, .. Rights and Excuses, CRIM. JUST.  ETHICS,  S L�ntr.t�er/Fall 1 9 34. at 
1 7 .  
1 1 6 .  ld. a t  ).4.  
l l 7 .  ld. at l 7 .  
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depend on the substance of  the reason the agent offers in her explanation of 
why she did i t .  When the action stems from a settled disposition ,  the reason the 
agent gives for having pursued the course she did will reveal somethin g  about 
her character. If the reason for the action, for example, was love for a friend 
or  a member of one ' s  family ,  we will usual ly take a benevolent vie w  of the 
agent. We do not find the action blameworthy, then ,  because it is a product of 
the very dispositions we would hope to inculcate by administering punishment 
or blame. The agent i s  responsible for the action in virtue of the voluntariness 
of the action, but she is not morally responsible, in the sense of culpable,  since 
the action is not a reflection of a vicious character. 
One might suppose that the above discussion misses the point, since what 
we want to know is whether our attitudes of sympathy and identification 
towards victims of duress are justified. The welfarist, for example ,  would 
maintain that the fact that we tend to understand and accept action performed 
for reasons of this sort does not do the normative work that must be done if we 
are to provide a rationale for the defense. If it does not enhance soc i al welfare 
to exonerate agents acting under duress, perhaps we cannot j ust ify a rule 
permitting the duress defense. 
B ut the welfarist response demands too much of moral theory. The ever 
so human dispositions tapped into by the coercer do not themselves s tand in 
need of justification, at least not at the level of analysis at which the question of 
exemption from punishment applies. Preferring our own preservation  to that of 
others, or wanting to save loved ones at the expense of strangers , are 
dispositions which form background conditions for normative analysis .  Legal 
and moral rules are at least substantial ly reflective of the ethical fabric of our 
actual mode of existence. Although they push and encourage ethical change at 
the margins, they do not create that fabric for the most part, and one should not 
expect to be able to justify them on the basis of first principles alone. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Our jurisprudence inherits from moral philosophy the mistaken view that 
human beings are moral ly accountable for all the intended consequences of 
their  behavior. The claim of thi s  Article has been that it is to this mistaken 
conception that we owe the bifurcation of theories of duress into the welfarist 
and voluntarist positions. But the conception itself only came to look sensible 
once a certain philosophical transformation had taken place, namely the notion 
of choice had replaced the Aristotel ian focus on dispositions. 
On a certai n  view, choice operates independently each time it is 
exercised.  Its consequences, i ntentional actions, must therefore be assessed 
individually .  No previous exercise of choice is relevant for present or  future 
choices. And this constitutes a rejection of the relevance of character to moral 
judgment, which l inks the choices and actions of a person over time. With the 
move from character to choice, there was a corresponding move from 
disposition to act. The single act became the centerpiece of modern ethics ,  and 
moral judgment became a way of evaluat ing individual acts, a turning away 
from the notion of ethical evaluation of persons .  Behavior i s  taken p iecemeal on 
the modem view: each act is assessed for the amount of good or bad it brings 
i n to the world.  Agents are thus morally accountable for a l l  the actions they 
perform i ntentionally,  since each i ntentional action represents an ind iv idual 
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choice. 
What i s  missing from the modern view is  a principle of moral evaluation 
of actors, and thi s  absence in the background concept ion requires a 
psychological theory of  exoneratio n  l i ke excuse to turn i nstead to the 
underlying voluntariness of the act. The natural focus on the actor i s  thus either 
eliminated, and excuses are transformed into justifications, or it is misconceived 
in a way that turns the voluntary into the involuntary in order to undermine the 
appli cabil i ty of ethical assessment. Fletcher is in a sense correct when he says 
that Anglo-American jurisprudence resists the concept of excuse. I I S We resist it 
as a grounds of moral judgment, even though we accept i t  as a grounds for 
denying the applicability of moral judgment. 
We have lost the ability to make sense of a defense l ike duress, then,  
because we have lost  the concept of character judgment, and we have put in i ts 
place the less coherent notion of moral  evaluation of an action, stemming from 
the idea that each action is the product of an independent exercise of choice. 
The concept of an excuse, however, fits into the space between j udgment of 
persons and judgment of actions. Since modern moral philosophy collapses this 
space, the possible bases for exoneration that remain are either increase in 
soci al welfare or bodily movement which is not intentional. 
This Article has presented the two standard rationales for duress and has 
attempted to show that neither rationale proves adequate to explain the defense 
in its present form. What the Article presents is not a complete theory of 
duress, but a way of conceptualizing the defense and a philosophical rationale 
for a concept with its general characteristics. It argues that the two standard 
theories emerge as the sole alternatives only against the background of the 
modern conception of respons ibi l i ty .  On a d i fferent concept ion of  
responsibil i ty ,  an older conception, a third possibil i ty emerges :  a notion of  
excuse which is  not based o n  Joss  of control or impaired voluntariness. Anglo­
American jurisprudence has been particularly resistant to the idea that excuse 
can i tself function as a normati ve principle, and since the only normative 
principle avai lable seems to be justification, i t  resorts to the nonmoral principle 
of defective action in order to exempt an actor from puni shment when 
justification is unavailable. But the supposition that the only ethical principle we 
have in our arsenal i s  the principle of welfare-maximizatio n  is an overly 
narrow one. It is a restriction one must accept only on a theory of moral 
responsibility that leaves disposi ti ons and character out of the picture. 
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